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When and how to publish
reports of mental health
homicide independent
investigations
Lucy Scott-Moncrieff1 and Ed Marsden2
In 1994 the Department of Health published its guidance on the discharge of mentally disordered people
and their continuing care in the community (HSG (94) 27) which established, for the first time, that
when a mental health service user kills someone “it will always be necessary to hold an Inquiry which is
independent of the providers involved”. The independent investigation (as these inquiries are now called)
would take place after the completion of any legal proceedings and its purpose was stated to be: “To learn
lessons for the future”. The independent investigation would be commissioned by the responsible strategic
health authority, which would also decide on whether to publish it and, if so, in what form.
The guidance says “Although it will not always be desirable for the final report to be made public, an undertaking
should be given at the start of the Inquiry that its main findings will be made available to interested parties”.
The guidance was updated in 2005, saying that independent investigations “should facilitate openness,
learning lessons and creating change”, and, when dealing with the publication and distribution of the report: 
“The SHA and, where appropriate, other organisations should devise a clear communication and media-
handling plan for the investigation report’s findings and the actions to be taken in response to any
recommendations made. When and how the findings are published should be clearly communicated to all
stakeholders, including victim/s, perpetrator, families, carers and staff involved”.
1 Partner, Scott-Moncrieff, Harbour & Sinclair (London); Member of the Law Society’s Mental Health and Disability
Committee; Associate of Verita.
2 Managing Director of Verita, a consultancy specialising in the management and conduct of investigations, reviews and inquiries
in public sector organisations.
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Most recently, in 2008, the National Patient Safety Agency, in Appendix 1 to its Good Practice Guidance
on “Independent investigation of serious patient safety incidents in mental health services” said:
“As a general rule, the greater the degree of legitimate public interest in the outcome of the investigation,
the stronger the argument that public accountability will require that professional staff be named in the
report, unless there are particular factors such as police concerns about safety” 
Openness and creating change, made explicit objectives in 2005, must have been implicit in the 1994 aim
of learning lessons; after all, how can lessons be learnt without openness, and what is the point of learning
lessons unless it leads to change? We know that there was much debate in the Department of Health
about the continued value of these expensive investigations: some, such as the Royal College of
Psychiatrists argued that they were not helpful, whereas others, such as the Zito Trust, strongly supported
their continuation. The Department was concerned that they did not help learning as much as had been
hoped, and we believe that the 2005 amendments were intended to give the guidance sharper focus on
the manner in which investigations should be carried out and the use to which they should be put. 
The arrival, between 1994 and 2005, of the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FoIA) may also have influenced the decision to give further guidance
in this area. 
However, despite the attempts at clarification, many organisations still do not accept that the need for
openness means that reports of independent investigations should usually be published in full.
Problems have arisen in three main areas: where a report contains confidential personal information, such
as in health and social services records; where professionals are seriously criticised in a high-profile case;
and where others mentioned in the report may be at risk. 
The purpose of this article is to explain the legal principles underlying the question of what and whether
to publish, and to offer to commissioners suggestions on how to make decisions in a way that takes proper
account of the competing interests of all concerned; victims, perpetrators, families, professionals, and the
public (who, it must be remembered, pay those being investigated as well as those doing the
investigation). The legal principles to be balanced in each case are the same, but the balance will differ
according to the circumstances of the person or group being considered: the names and personal
information of those who are more peripheral to the investigation, such as the relatives of victims, are
likely to attract a greater right to privacy than the names and personal information of professionals whose
activities are particularly under scrutiny.
Guiding principles
We start from the position that full publication is the expected outcome: commissioners of an
independent investigation should make their decisions about the report, including what and whether to
publish, in accordance with the agreed aims of the investigation. The latest guidance quoted above has
created a presumption in favour of publishing the whole report, without anonymity for professionals.
Good grounds for rebutting the presumption would include:
• Confidentiality: that the report contains confidential information about individuals who have a
legitimate expectation that their privacy would be respected. An example of this would be where the
history of the contact between service user and service providers, which needs to be set out to provide
context, is entangled with the contact that the service user’s immediate family had with those
services, and the family did not consent to the disclosure of their confidential information. 
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For instance, the authors are aware of a case where both the victim and perpetrator were mental
health service-users, with the victim’s vulnerability arising from the abuse that she had suffered within
her family. It was relevant to speak of the abuse, but it was not part of the investigation’s role to lay
out the family dynamics in any detail, nor to encroach on the family’s right of privacy, so the source
of the abuse was not referred to in the report.
• Risk of harm: that publication of all or parts of the report would put certain people at risk of physical
or mental harm. We are aware of a case where a perpetrator who had killed a close relative made
threats against members of his family if they gave evidence to the subsequent investigation. Although
the perpetrator was detained, the threats were taken seriously, and the strategic health authority
decided to publish a redacted version of the report, so that the perpetrator would not realise that the
threatened family members had given evidence to the investigation. There are also cases where
professionals may be assessed as being at risk, as happened in the Stone investigation, discussed in
more detail below.
• Discouraging co-operation; that publication of all or parts of the report would militate against the
aims of learning lessons and creating change. There is a school of thought that professionals may be
unwilling to co-operate with independent investigations if they anticipate that they will be publicly
criticised, as they will be afraid of drawing down on their own heads the public vitriol and abuse that
has been heaped on other individuals in these circumstances. The Department of Health and some
strategic health authorities are also concerned that the learning/no blame culture they are trying to
foster will be put at risk if criticised individuals are identified by name. We think these concerns are
overrated – even individuals who must realise that they can expect to be criticised are remarkably
open and frank in describing and discussing their activities, and most people who are invited to give
evidence to inquiries do so without hesitation. Occasionally, potential witnesses are reluctant, but
many of them decide in the end that they wish to tell their story. Few people fail to attend, or having
attended, fail to speak openly.
In considering whether the presumption of full publication has been rebutted, the principles of Articles
8 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) will apply, as well as relevant domestic law
including case law, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FoIA).
Domestic law has to be interpreted in accordance with the ECHR, so for simplicity’s sake we will focus
on the ECHR. 
Article 8:
(1). Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2). There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
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(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
These articles create opposing rights, one to privacy (to withhold information from publication) and one
to know (to receive and impart information). However there is no paradox here, as both are qualified by
exceptions that, in certain circumstances, meet in the middle. So your right to privacy can be overridden
by our right to know, and vice versa. 
The exceptions apply only if they are ‘necessary’: in ECHR terms this means that a pressing social need
is involved and that the measure employed is proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. Deciding
in any particular case whether the right to privacy trumps the right to know involves a balancing exercise
in which all relevant information has to be identified and then given its correct weight so that the correct
result will be achieved. The decision-making body must not only take into account all relevant matters,
but also must not be influenced by irrelevant matters and must not fetter any discretion it may have by
making decisions in advance with, or little regard for, the facts of the particular case. 
For instance, the authors have frequently heard suggestions that the risk of media intrusion into the lives
of named staff is automatically a sufficient justification for anonymisation. Whether or not anonymisation
on this ground alone would be seen as a proportionate response to a pressing social need (we think not)
the creation of a policy not to disclose amounts to the decision-maker fettering its discretion, thus
rendering the decision legally flawed and open to challenge. Of course if media intrusion were (probably)
likely to lead to risk of physical harm it would be another story, but media intrusion on its own, however
unpleasant, is part and parcel of an open society and should not attract the protection of Article 10(2). 
Article 8 will carry great weight when the issue relates to the withholding of sensitive confidential
information, such as medical records, whereas Article 10 will probably have a head start where the issue
relates to non-confidential information, such as the names of criticised professionals. However it will
always be necessary to look at both articles.
The most pertinent case to offer guidance on Article 8 and confidentiality is that of Michael Stone.
In Stone v South East Coast Strategic Health Authority & Ors [2006] EWHC 1668 (Admin) (12 July 2006)
Michael Stone, convicted of the murders of Lin and Megan Russell 10 years earlier, went to court to try
and prevent the disclosure of his confidential records in the report of the independent investigation set
up after his conviction3. The judgment, which went against him, focused on Article 8 of the ECHR, and
in structuring the necessary balancing exercise between Mr Stone’s right to have the confidentiality of his
health and social work records respected and the public’s right to have a full understanding of his
involvement with services, Mr Justice Davis, said:
“... an ultimate balance has to be struck not only by weighing the considerations for and against a
restriction on the right to privacy by reference to Article 8 itself but also by weighing the considerations
for and against a restriction on publication by reference to Article 10;” (para 34)
3 Robert Francis QC, who chaired the inquiry, contributed ‘The Michael Stone Inquiry- A Reflection’ in the Journal of Mental
Health Law, May 2007 @ pp 41–49. The ‘Report of the independent inquiry into the care and treatment of Michael Stone’
was commissioned by West Kent Health Authority, Kent County Council Social Services, and Kent Probation Service. It was
published in September 2006.
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and that the test for publication was high:
“... The protection of personal data, and the need for appropriate safeguards, is of fundamental
importance to a person’s enjoyment of the right to respect for private and family life provided by Article 8:
and that is particularly so in the case of medical data” (para 31), 
and therefore: 
“... a compelling case needs to exist to justify publication of this report in its present form” (para 32). 
The judge gave great weight to the fact that Mr Stone was entitled to claim a right to privacy, particularly
in relation to medical information, which is seen as one of the fundamental privacies to be protected by
Article 8. He also recognised that it was in the public interest: 
“... first, that persons may talk freely with their doctors, probation officers and other such persons without
being deterred by risk of subsequent disclosure (although it has to be said such a risk in any case exists
under English common law rules relating to confidentiality, where disclosure is necessary in the public
interest); second, that such persons may give access to such information for the purposes of an inquiry
without being deterred from doing so through fear of such matters later being released into the public
domain” (para 44).
However, on balance, he decided that the public interest in publication outweighed Mr Stone’s right to
privacy. The reasons were:
• There was a true public interest in the public at large knowing of the actual care and treatment
supplied, or not supplied, to Mr Stone and being able to reach an informed assessment of the failures
identified and the recommendations made.
• Such objectives were not met simply by releasing a full version of the report to relevant health
professionals. 
• Where individuals and agencies were, or were not, to be criticised, the public was legitimately entitled
to know the reasons.
• The information was being disclosed solely to provide an informed view as to what went wrong with
a view to lessons being learned for the future, both for the assistance of other service-users and for
the protection and reassurance of the public.
• Mr Stone’s right to privacy was reduced because the investigation, and therefore the need to seek
privacy, arose from his own criminal acts.
• A great deal of detailed information about Mr Stone’s background, treatment and mental health was
already in the public domain, as shown by numerous newspaper articles. This did not extinguish 
Mr Stone’s right to privacy, but did diminish any possible adverse effect of publication.
• The surviving victim, Josie Russell, and her father supported publication.
Having decided against Mr Stone on the balancing act required within Article 8, where the initial
premise is in favour of privacy, it was not necessary to spend much time on Article 10, where the initial
premise is in favour of publication, and the judge decided in a few words that the balancing provisions
required within Article 10 could only support the view he came to on Article 8. 
The decision was based on the facts of the case, and involved the records of a perpetrator, but the
considerations set out in the judgment are of general application and should also guide decision-makers
if someone other than a perpetrator, for instance a surviving victim, or a family member of either victim
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or perpetrator, seeks to prevent publication of confidential records.
There are many cases dealing with Article 10 and restrictions on the right to know. We consider the case
of In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47, to be particularly helpful
in showing how the balancing exercise between Articles 10 and 8 should take place where anonymity is
being sought: the issue was whether, in the interests of protecting a child whose mother was to be tried
for the murder of his brother, the identity of his mother should be kept out of media reports of the trial.
Articles 8 and 10 were engaged, and Lord Steyn, who gave the leading judgement, commented: 
“The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions in the House of Lords in
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1232. For present purposes the decision of the House on the facts
of Campbell and the differences between the majority and the minority are not material. What does,
however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such
precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense
focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is
necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into
account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each.”
Lord Steyn also agreed with the first instance judge, who described his approach thus:
“…in carrying out the balance required by the ECHR, to begin by acknowledging the force of the
argument under article 10 before considering whether the right of the child under article 8 was sufficient
to outweigh it”.
In our experience, the careful, thorough and principled approach to decision-making described in these
two judgements is the exception rather than the rule, particularly where anonymisation is sought: there
is no consistent method of evaluating the need for anonymisation; decisions are made on widely different
criteria, and decision-making processes range from robust to inadequate. Inconsistent decisions, decision-
making processes and, indeed, legal advice, give an impression of arbitrariness which is undesirable in so
important an area.
The decision-making process 
The commissioners should prepare the ground by making it clear at the outset that it intends to publish
in full unless the law requires otherwise.
Whether the law does require otherwise will depend on the limitation on publication that is being sought.
Withholding confidential information 
The steps to be taken in reaching a decision on publication of confidential information should start from
the position that those writing and commissioning the report must not publish any such information
unless there is a strong public interest to do so. If they are satisfied that there is, they should:
• seek consent to publish;
• make every reasonable effort not to include information unnecessarily (for instance by précising parts
of the report if this would not damage its value);
• give the subject of the information an opportunity to make representations; and
• provide detailed justification for publishing the information, by reference to any representations made
by the subject of the information and to the principles of Article 8 and, if necessary, Article 10. 
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Example
The judge was complimentary about the thorough and principled way the authors of the Stone report had
gone about this exercise:
“The Panel had, in preparing its report, been well aware of issues of confidentiality and of the rights of
Mr Stone under Article 8. Indeed, the Panel had been at pains to obtain Mr Stone’s written consent for
the inquiry to have access to details about his treatment and care, which was given. (It was not, however,
disputed at the trial before me that Mr Stone was subsequently free to refuse to give his consent to actual
publication of the resulting report). It is notable that in a letter dated 9th July 2004 Mr Francis had
explained that in preparing its report the Panel had considered whether the facts set out were (in the view
of the Panel) necessary to be included in the public interest after taking account of Mr Stone’s rights in
respect of his privacy and the confidentiality of his records. I unhesitatingly accept that as being the
Panel’s approach. Specific examples are given of matters excluded from the final version of the report by
the Panel as not satisfying this requirement”.
A version of the report with the confidential information removed was prepared, but was rejected by the
commissioners. The judge accepted that they were right to do so because:
• The deletions of the details would have prevented the public from knowing precisely what facts had
prompted the conclusions and comments of the Panel as set out in Chapter 8. The conclusions and
comments were necessarily based on the preceding details.
• The actual details of what was in the medical and other records was crucial for assessing (and for
forming an opinion on) what other professionals, dealing with Mr Stone, either at the time or
subsequently, should have known or should have done – ie what did they know but not act upon,
what did they not know but which they should have known, and what information and records were,
or were not, passed on to other agencies?
• To the extent that individuals and procedures were criticised (or not criticised) in the report, the
reader needed to know the details of what such individuals knew or could reasonably be expected to
have known in order to assess such criticisms. 
Consideration of the criteria in Stone will help decision-makers in future cases. Once the relevant
elements (and only the relevant elements) have been identified and weighted, a decision can be made as
to whether the right to know outweighs the right to privacy in the particular case.
Using these measures, set within the strong presumption in favour of respecting the confidentiality of
health and social care records, it seems likely that a family member of a perpetrator or of a victim would
be able to insist on their name being withheld and on the confidentiality of their records being respected.
This issue arises only when the records of family members, particularly siblings, are inextricably entangled
with those of the perpetrator or victim, and ingenuity may be necessary to protect the privacy of family
members when their relationship with the perpetrator or victim is a matter of public knowledge.
Anonymisation
As mentioned previously, the commissioning strategic health authority is responsible for determining
whether and how an investigation report is published. There is no doubt that reports can be anonymised;
the National Patient Safety Agency guidance makes this clear, the Stone report and others have been
anonymised without challenge, and the Information Commissioner, in a Decision Notice dated 2nd June
2008 concerning Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Trust (ref: FS50124800) has confirmed that, in
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principle, names can be withheld even if an application is made under the FoIA for full publication. 
Article 10(2) provides that publication can be restricted if full publication would put an individual or the
public at risk of harm. The most likely scenario is where professionals in a high-profile case are strongly
criticised and it is feared that they may become the targets of vigilantes. Article 10(2) is also relevant
when the question is whether publication of the names of criticised professionals will damage the
effectiveness of future investigations through reducing the willingness of professionals to speak freely
about their involvement in the events under investigation. Here the test is whether publication should
be withheld on the grounds of “public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of
health or morals”, on the basis that if investigations become less effective as a result of professional
reticence, the likelihood of lessons being learned and change occurring will be reduced, and violent
crimes may take place that otherwise might not have. However solid evidence would be needed that this
was a likely consequence of publication, and the evidence available so far is to the contrary.
Many of the same matters must be weighed in the balance as in decisions on whether or not to publish
confidential information, but the emphasis is different where the information is not confidential. Many
types of investigation take place in the public sector, and it is often clear from the outset that the
information obtained from staff in these investigations will not be published. Therefore, to avoid the risk
of misunderstanding, it is crucially important that people giving evidence to an independent homicide
investigation are told in advance that what they say may be published in the final report, and that they
may be identified as the source of that material unless there are legitimate public interest reasons why this
should not be the case. 
Once this has been done, the question of anonymisation can be dealt with, by following the procedure set out
in In re S (A Child) (2004) (referred to earlier in this article). The commissioners should establish the
justification for publication under Article 10, starting with the official guidance quoted above, and
considering the various matters mentioned Mr Justice Davis in the Stone case. They should bear in mind that
the greater the significance of the case, and the greater the public concern, the stronger the case for
publication with names. This will be the case whether the case is of local or national importance, as the courts
accept that people get their information from local media as much, or more, than from the national media.
They would then need to consider whether there was any justification for anonymity under Article 10(2):
public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of
the reputation or rights of others. 
Concerns might be that:
• Staff may be at risk from a perpetrator.
• Staff may be less willing to co-operate with investigations if they know what they say may be
published.
• If individual staff members are at fault this should be dealt with by their employing agency and they
should not be pilloried in public.
• Individual staff members have no effective means after publication of defending themselves.
• Other reports do not name staff so this one should not.
• Where a report is critical of individuals, publication can only lead to the ‘name and shame’ culture
which increasingly stigmatises public services and individuals and is inconsistent with a learning
organisation.
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• Naming individuals adds nothing to the report’s value in identifying and commenting on issues of
concern which the organisations involved should address.
• Naming clinical staff can adversely affect their relationships with other patients/service-users.
Some of these concerns will attract the protection of Article 10(2), and some will not. If the concern does
not fall within one of the pressing social needs identified in Article 10(2) then there is no protection, and
even if it does, it is also necessary to establish that anonymisation is proportionate to the legitimate aim
being pursued. 
Someone who had a well-founded belief that he or she would be harassed, victimised or attacked or made
ill if details of his or her involvement were published, would certainly have a case that public safety, the
prevention of crime, the protection of health and the protection of their rights and reputation would be
engaged. Therefore if a professional seeks anonymity on any of these grounds, the employer would have
to undertake a proper risk assessment, involving, if necessary, police and medical assessments. If it is
thought that a realistic risk exists, the nature, seriousness, extent and duration of the risk should be
quantified, so that proper weight can be given to this in the subsequent balancing exercise. It should be
remembered that even if a risk of harm is identified, publication may still be justified if the risk is thought
to be manageable and acceptable. Whatever the outcome, the employer would have a responsibility to
seek to mitigate any risk to the employee.
It is also important to see whether the feared undesirable outcomes will occur whether or not
professionals are named. For instance, the perpetrator will be entitled to copies of his medical and other
records, and it would not be difficult for the names of criticised staff to be identified in this way. Neither
the perpetrator nor his/her family have any duty of confidentiality towards the professionals, and if they
believe that professionals are being unfairly protected from public criticism, they could easily rectify the
situation.
Similarly, the involvement of individual members of staff is likely to be well known within the service, and
criticism will be accurately attached to the right person, whether or not their name is published.
If the case is of sufficient public interest (and such cases are likely to throw up these issues) it is also likely
that an application for full publication will be made under the FoIA. The process of applying is cheap and
simple, and the Information Commissioner is bound to order publication unless one of the limited
exceptions apply. 
It seems likely that if anonymisation will not be effective in protecting people mentioned in the report, it
will not be seen as a proportionate response to a pressing social need.
A number of the concerns mentioned are not generated by the anticipation of harm, but rather by the
upset that criticism of named individuals will have on those criticised, on their colleagues, and on
specialist mental health services generally. These concerns are sincerely held, but nonetheless they need
to be robustly interrogated, and mere assertions that certain consequences will flow from publishing
names should never be accepted without supporting evidence. The fact that individuals may feel
vulnerable and frightened is not, in itself, a good reason for withholding their identities from a published
report, although it would be an good reason to offer them support before, during, and after publication. 
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Example4
The commissioners of the Stone report provide an example of an excellent decision-making process. 
The justification for anonymisation was measured against agreed legal principles, and was required to be
supported with robust evidence with commissioners instructing lawyers to guide them through the
process
At a joint meeting in 2001 of the three agencies that commissioned the inquiry into the care and
treatment of Michael Stone (West Kent Health Authority, Kent County Council and Kent Probation
Service), concerns were expressed that given the horrific nature of the original crime and Mr Stone’s
continued denial of the offence, naming staff in the report might place them at risk. In recognition of the
seriousness of this concern, the agencies sought the advice of Kent Police. A detective superintendent
who was well acquainted with the case but who had not been part of the criminal investigation was
nominated to conduct a formal risk assessment. The assessment was commissioned in April 2001. 
It found evidence to suggest that certain individuals would be at risk if named in the report. In July 2002
the assistant chief constable wrote to the commissioning agencies recommending that all names should
be removed from the report before publication.
The commissioning agencies discussed the implications of the risk assessment with their lawyers and with
the authors of the report. The chairman said that the panel’s role was to conduct the inquiry and present
their report to the commissioners and that it was for the commissioners to decide what form publication
might take. He said the panel felt, however, that the report should be published in full.
The legal advice was that the commissioning agencies had a duty to satisfy themselves as to the strength
of the evidence upon which the police risk assessment was based. Accordingly, in October 2002
representatives of the commissioning agencies met Kent Police to review the evidence. The meeting
decided that certain members of staff were entitled to anonymity and the commissioners then considered
the possible effect of granting anonymity only to them and not to the others directly involved in 
Mr Stone’s care. They decided that, in the interests of all the staff directly involved with Mr Stone’s care,
all should be anonymised so that none stood out and none could be identified by a process of elimination.
However the commissioners did not agree to anonymise the whole report, and published the names of
managers in senior positions of responsibility.
In deciding partially to anonymise the report the commissioning agencies had to balance the public
interest of protecting care staff and others against the public interest in open and transparent publication.
During this process suggestions had been made that the risk of media intrusion against named and
criticised staff justified anonymity, but leading counsel advising the commissioners indicated that he did
not consider that this alone was a justification for anonymity.
Conclusion
The framework for decision-making in public services is long established and well-known to those who
have to use it: the purposes of independent investigations are clearly articulated, and authoritative
judicial guidance on the matters to be taken into consideration when balancing rights protected by
Articles 8 and 10 is now readily available. 
4 The source of many of the statements of fact which are set out in the paragraphs which follow, is the ‘Report of the independent
inquiry into the care and treatment of Michael Stone’ (September 2006). See n. 3 above.
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In the interests of the credibility of the public services concerned, decision-making must demonstrably be
both consistent and transparent.
To build on existing good practice, the decision-making processes in the Stone case should be replicated,
proportionately, in other independent homicide investigations involving a challenge to full publication.
In most cases it will not be necessary to obtain external legal advice, but decisions should always be
evidence-based, in accordance with the law, and made by the strategic health authority board or one of
its delegated committees. 
We hope that greater consistency in publication, coupled with the proposals for a structured independent
post–review process to track the implementation of recommendations, (as proposed in Learning Lessons:
Using Inquiries for Change (2009) by Gillian Downham and Richard Lingham5) will boost the value of
homicide investigations to all stakeholders.
5 Journal of Mental Health Law, Spring 2009 pp 57–69.
